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       The article under reference is interesting and has some seminal ideas. Reviewing the 
contents of the paper is not the objective of this brief note. The intention essentially is to keep the 
record straight. The authors raise, in a measure, the ticklish issue of “difference between Islamic 
financing in theory and practice" that keeps engaging the attention of writers on Islamic finance 
so frequently. While theory demands risk sharing in business ventures, banks largely use fixed 
return modes in Islamic finance. The article under reference addresses the issue with regard to 
sukuk as a mode of project financing. However, in the process it makes some observations on my 
profit sharing ratios’ determination which I find untenable.  
       We shall discuss three of the issues raised in the paper to clarify our position: (i) agency 
problem in mudaraba financing, (ii) the workings of profit sharing mechanism and (iii) the role 
that interest plays in the determination of profit sharing ratios in a dual financing system. 
       We may begin with some prefacing remarks to avoid semantic confusion. The distinction 
between musharakah and mudaraba is not well established in the literature on Islamic finance. 
Even in fiqhi discussions their distinguishing features remain untouched or at best unclear. The 
terms are often used interchangeably (See for example Usmani 2010). In the following argument 
we shall employ mudaraba (conditions) for both. 
        Some writers blame in main the agency problems for the banks’ reluctance to using 
mudaraba as a financing mode. One need not deny the existence of the problem but to highlight 
it as the focal factor overriding others to account for mudaraba unpopularity with the banks looks 
rather overstretched. Presumably, the changing attitudes, structures and environs that 
characterize socio-economic dynamism in recent times have greater explanatory significance. 
       Agency problems refer to self-seeking on the part of individuals or their groups at the 
expense of others in a chain of organizational relationships forged for promoting collective 
benefits and sharing the same equitably. Agency problems, big or small, are scattered throughout 
the hierarchic structure of modern corporations and their nexus with the socio-political influence 
centres in no longer a secret. The literature is awash with illustrations of agency-induced tensions 
between managers and shareholders, between owners and their employees, between shareholders 
and corporate creditors, between politicians and contract-seeking businesses ad infinitum. The 
roots of agency problems lie deep in asymmetric information, tilted power structures and 
rampant moral degradation. These factors are indeed the germ-carriers of recurring financial 
crises, of mega bank failures, and now of increasing state bankruptcies. Agency problem is 
needlessly overblown in case of mudaraba (See for example Bacha 1997).  
        Mudaraba is of two types: pure or mixed. The puritan form is rooted in the classical fiqh 
and rests on the assumption that the entrepreneur (firm) is empty-handed; the financier (bank) 
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provides all the capital for business. Candidly, the two share the loss if any in a 0:1 ratio. The 
larger portion of profit goes to the entrepreneur; the Malikis explicitly allow no more than 50% 
share to the financier (Hasan 1985). 
            However, the real romance of the PLS programs one finds in the mixed mudaraba models 
of the recent origin. Here, part of the capital investment the firm commits to the project; the other 
part comes from the financing bank. Losses the parties must always share in the same ratio as 
their capital contributions. Thus, the profit sharing ratio alone is negotiable between the parties. 
Also, the negotiation is with reference to that part of profit only which is allocable to the portion 
of capital provided by the financing bank. In other words, if λ is the proportion of bank finance 
in the total capital K, then of the profit P only the amount λP would be the subject matter for the 
sharing negotiations between the parties. If they agree that the bank would get σ* portion then 
σ*λP amount will go to the bank If we put σP = σ* λP then σ can be defined as the fraction of the 
total profit P the bank would get. It comes about that, σ = σ*λ. As each of σ* and λ is less than 1, 
σmust be less than λ. We have used σ in our papers in addition to σ* for exploring the macro  
relationships underpinning the models (Hasan 1985). The table below makes clear the difference 
between and the relationship of the two versions. 
 
 
 
Total investment $1000 million (K) 
  ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 Firm’s Equity                                                            Bank (Mudarabah) 
                                $200 million (λK)                                                    $800 million (1-λ)K 
                                        λ = 1/5                    (rate of profit r = 0.4)             1-λ = 4/5                                       
                                                               Profit earned on $1000 million                      
                                                                        $400 million (rK) 
                                       --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                          $400 x 1/5 = $80 million                                        $400 x 4/5 = $320 million     
                                 0.7 = (1-σ*)                 Agreed sharing ratios                  0.3 = σ*  
                         $320 x 0.7 = $224 million                                         $320 x 0.3 = $96 million       
                         $80 +224 = $304 million            Verification 
                                                                    σ = σ*λ = 0.3 x 4/5 = 0.24    
                                                                σ P = 0.24 x 400 = $96 million  ------------  
                                       ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                            Final division 
 
 
 
    The authors referring to Hasan 2002 paper observe “The model was built under the assumption that 
the profit sharing ratio of the financier cannot be greater than his loss sharing ratio” (P.47). This is at 
once untrue. The authors do not provide any documentation on the point. They failed to see that two 
concepts of the sharing ratio have been used in our papers: one (σ*) for the firm level analysis and the 
other (σ) for macro level manipulations. Please see the above illustration inserted for the purpose. Here, 
σ* is the firm level profit sharing ratio for the bank which could be greater or smaller than the loss 
  
Figure 1: Profit sharing process under mudarabah in a dual financing system, 
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sharing or leverage ratio ƛ In contrast,  is the instrument for the macro level explanations and 
must be less than  analytically, not by assumption. 
         The article further comments: “the interest rate in Hasan (2002) model renders its 
acceptability problematic in the context of Islamic finance. Moreover it can be shown that 
ultimately the return to the financier is equal to the interest rate and the risk premium. This 
makes the robustness of the model questionable” (PP. 47-48).   
        This is a naïve observation to put it mildly. The model under reference was presented first 
in Hasan (1985) article published in the King Abdulaziz University Journal. The later writings in 
2002 and 2010 on the subject maintained the position on the ratio question. And no subsequent 
publications were noticed in English language at least by-passing the model. One can see its 
imprints on the writings of both Bacha (1997) and Habib (2002). 
       The 1985 paper discussed the determination of sharing ratios in the realistic scenario of 
Islamic banks operating in competition with interest charging conventional banks in a dual 
financial setting. The model postulated that the profit sharing ratio σ for the bank at the macro 
level is likely to be the function of four variables – r the expected rate of profit on total capital 
employed, the ratio ƛof bank finance to total capital invested, the rate of interest i, and a risk 
premium α. The message was that in a dual system interest rate will be an unavoidable influence 
operating on the profit sharing ratios. Illogic alone could go against this truth. In the competitive 
setting of financing religion cannot be assumed to influence customer choice. Will it be 
reasonable to presume a faith-neutral banker to opt for putting his money in a profit sharing 
project if the sharing ratio is not expected to yield a rate of return on his investment at least equal 
to the prevailing rate of interest plus the premium for risk his investment carries? Can we deny 
the fact that current Islamic finance is using interest rates as bench marks so brazenly?  
       The so-called innovative model the authors have put up in their paper is complicated, is 
based on unrealistic assumptions and stands on non-existent evidence. It does not spell out any 
workable policy conclusions. Computer simulations suit natural sciences which have eternal 
laws; social dynamism tends to throw their forecasts in economic matters fast into the dust bin of 
history. 
                                                   Allah knows best 
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